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BOOK REVIEW
MEANING AND DEVELOPMENT BEHIND AMERICAN LAW
LAW IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY. By Lawrence M.
Friedman. New York: Modem Library, A Division of
Random House, Inc. 2002. Pp. 207. $19.95 (hardback).
Reviewed by Britney Beall-Eder*
INTRODUCTION
As American law develops over time, the meaning and implications
of our cultural norms mirror society's chosen rules. At times, American
law can produce unjust results.' However, just, in addition to unjust, re-
2suits develop historically based on the values and customs of the times.
The development of American law has been a rich and diverse process,
creating a complex legal system based on customs, values, and interpre-
tations of the Constitution, sometimes static and other times changing
with society. Understanding the law's developmental process explains
the law's current role in everyday American life in the new millennium.
Lawrence M. Friedman's Law in America: A Short History explains the
role of law in American society from the colonial period to the present to
illustrate his theory that "American law is a reflection of what goes on in
American society in general. '4
Friedman's chronological account of American history correlates
the law to the values, enforcement mechanisms, and societal norms of
different historical periods. Although the legal historian may need to
look elsewhere and delve deeper to understand legal history, this book
gives a short, illustrative account of the role of American law in history
for the layperson.
Structurally, Friedman divides the book into four parts reflecting on
four different eras: the colonial period, the nineteenth century, the twen-
tieth century, and the beginning of the twenty-first century. Within each
time period, Friedman evaluates major themes and developments in the
law pertaining to that era. Friedman's use of temporal categorization
* J.D. Candidate, 2003, University of Denver College of Law.
I. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (establishing the "separate but equal"
doctrine, which validated segregation, and holding that "[iuf the two races are to meet upon terms of
social equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other's merits
and a voluntary consent of individuals."), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, LAW IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY 6-7 (2002).
3. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 12-13.
4. Id. at 37.
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creates a historical narrative of the past for the reader, but gives substan-
tially less attention than others.5
In this review, Part I explores the law in colonial times, specifically
evaluating the influence of English law upon colonial ideology. In addi-
tion, Part I looks at Friedman's account of colonial slavery and the pro-
gression towards independence from England. Part II examines the law's
development during the nineteenth century and the changes that Fried-
man contends resulted from the development of American law beyond
the borrowed common law from England. Part HI summarizes the dra-
matic increase in legislation in the twentieth century. It also explores
Friedman's view of the changing role of law enforcement, tort and con-
tract law, and the impact of the civil rights movement. Finally, Part IV
explores the beginning of the twenty-first century through Friedman's
eyes and the impact of past generations of the law on contemporary soci-
ety.
I. COLONIAL AMERICA AND THE LAW
In Law in America: A Short History, Lawrence M. Friedman de-
votes little space to colonial law, briefly describing the role of American
law in the colonial period. Friedman focuses on three underlying themes:
the relationship between law and religious values; colonial slavery; and
the progression towards independence from England. The extremely
limited scope of Friedman's discussion of colonial America tends to de-
value the impact of early American law, thus presenting a less-than-
accurate picture of the era.
A. Law to Achieve Religious Morality
Friedman begins by discussing the emergence of colonial law. "In
essence, [the colonial legal system] was English law-at least in the
sense that this was the only system the colonists knew anything about."6
However, in addition to following the English law, Friedman contends
the colonists also incorporated their own values and needs into American
law.7 Friedman asserts, in effect, that this integration contradicted the
ideologies of traditional English men and women. 8 For example, the Pu-
ritans developed law to achieve what they perceived was a more holy
society.9 Friedman argues that the Puritans implemented procedures in
5. See Carl A. Pierce, The Law in America, 42 TENN. L. REV. 615, 619 (1975) (reviewing
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (1973)). In reviewing Friedman's earlier
book, Pierce asserts that Friedman fails to give adequate attention to certain time periods. Id. Here,
the colonial period is given substantially less attention in the book than the Nineteenth and Twenti-
eth Centuries. Thus, although being criticized for the flaw in analysis twenty-seven years earlier,
Friedman still fails to give adequate attention to certain time periods, most particularly the colonial
era.






their daily lives that they believed would help to achieve a godly soci-
ety. 10 The Puritans, therefore, designed and orchestrated a legal system
that would achieve results they desired."
Friedman makes an interesting point in asserting that the Puritans
shaped the law to fit the religious morals they strove to achieve. He fails,
however, to adequately connect colonial law and the reasons underlying
the Puritans need for intertwining religion with law. Why did the Puri-
tans need religion in order to form a moral society? To that effect, why
did they need law when they had religion? And more importantly, how
did they make the conversion from technical English law to a hodge-
podge set of rules defined by religious values and morals of the time?
Friedman, therefore, proposes a viable thesis, but fails to adequately ex-
plain himself.
B. Colonial Slavery
Friedman also discusses slavery during the colonial era. He asserts
that one of the mirrors shining back at the colonists was, unfortunately,
the law of slavery.'2 Although "slavery was unknown to England, and
English law," by 1640, "legal" slavery appeared in Virginia's history.'
3
Friedman posits that "a strong consciousness of race" was a key aspect
in the development of the slave custom and laws, as it certainly did not
fit in with the godly society of many colonial communities. 14 Although
slavery was an immoral practice of the colonists, Friedman explains that
the slaves served an important role in supporting the colonial economy. 5
Specifically, labor shortages on the sugar plantations drove the demand
for slaves. 16 The Africans transported to the colonies were "culturally
and racially" different from the colonists. 17 Friedman posits that "[t]he
deep consciousness of race-America's original sin-helped to bind
these foreign servants to a status that degraded and exploited them."'1
8
Friedman, however, fails to explain the source of race consciousness.
Why did white colonists perceive African slaves differently from, for
example, white indentured servants? Was race consciousness the cause
of the African slave trade or was race consciousness its result?
10. See id. at 24-25.
11. See id. at 25 (explaining that the Puritans lived in "small, tight-knit, hierarchical" commu-
nities where the leading voices in the community were the clergy and the male heads of the house-
hold). The Puritans believed that their ideologies and societal values were best represented by male
clergy and, thus, reprimanded those in their community who did not conform to their values by
punishing church truancy, blasphemy, and morally reprehensible behavior. Id. at 24-25.
12. See id. at 25-26.
13. Id. at 26-27.
14. Id. at 27.
15. See id. at 28.
16. See id. ("Blacks were imported from Africa to do the hard work in the fields. Slavery was
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As slavery became more rooted in colonial life, so too did the grow-
ing "body of slave law."'19 Slave law gave slavery the stamp of approval,
thus further instilling racism into colonial America.20 Friedman argues
that "the law codified custom and crystallized it; it put its enforcement
power behind the 'peculiar institution. ' ' 21 In subsequent chapters,
Friedman describes slavery's unfortunate and lasting effects. In contend-
ing that there remains no equivalent to the damaging effects of American
slave law,22 Friedman distinguishes his approach to the colonial era from
that of most historians, who place the greatest emphasis in the colonial
times on the progression towards independence from England.23
C. Progression Towards Independence from England and the Emer-
gence of Early American Law
By the time of King George III's reign, colonial America had grown
quite different from old England.24 Friedman explains that, except for
slavery, colonial America was much more egalitarian than England due1 • ~25 "Ae
to the differing conditions in the colonies. In colonial America, land
was more abundant and society was less organized.26 People born in the
colonies had no incentive to remain loyal to the mother country. 27 Al-
though Friedman effectively explains the significance of the physical
separation and the geographic differences between England and the
colonies, he still undervalues religion as an impetus for the colonists'
move for independence, which culminated in the Revolutionary War.
After the war, the colonies set out to form an independent repub-
lic. 28 "It was to be a 'government of laws and not of men.' 29 The colo-
nists' decision to pledge their allegiance, not to a king, but to the law,
was "the basis for the experiment in democracy---or at least in democ-
racy as defined by the leading men of the time., 30 This "American ex-
periment," Friedman explains, was a society based on "laws, rules[, and]
general principles," rather than the divine rights of royalty.
3'
The first attempt at creating colonial American law resulted in the
Articles of Confederation.32 Friedman posits that, because the Articles of
19. Id. at 29.
20. See id.
21. Id. Specifically, Friedman divides slave law into three categories in the colonial period:
rules pertaining to the status of black slaves, rules pertaining to controlling and punishing slaves, and
technical law dealing with their rights to property, water, etc. Id. at 29-30.
22. See id. at 30.
23. Id. at 31.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 31-32.









Confederation formed a weak central government, they proved unsuc-
cessful at providing a legal framework capable of unifying the colonies.
33
As a result, a convention proposed and adopted a federal constitution.
34
The Constitution, Friedman argues, "has lasted so long, and served the
country so well, because it is brief and general-helped by the fact that it
acquired, very soon, a kind of aura of the sacred. 35 In effect, the Consti-
tution was the voice of the people; it established fundamental principles
36and rules that apply across time.
Although the reader is left trying to connect early colonial religious
values to the constitutional framework that ultimately emerged, Fried-
man does an artful job of explaining the progression towards freedom in
colonial America. Friedman's past writings on the topic have been criti-
cized for not evaluating the relationship between law and morals in the
colonial period.37 Here, Friedman adequately makes this connection.
However, more space could be devoted to other important building
blocks of the era, such as "the politicization of legal issues, 38 "economic
instrumentalism, ''39 and other legal institutions that had an impact on the
future of American law.4°
Although Friedman acknowledges that traditional English law was
the only law with which the colonists were familiar,4 ' ultimately, he un-
derestimates colonial law's impact upon American legal history. In a
review of another Friedman book on American legal history, Carl A.
Pierce makes a similar criticism. 42 In the earlier book, Friedman suggests
that "only collectors and historians care about Massachusetts' laws of
16 30 ,, 43 which may explain why Friedman's account of the colonial pe-
riod is so brief in comparison to other periods. However, understanding
why the colonists deviated from the common law when developing their
own American law could explain the gradual move of the law toward a
democratic nation.
In addition, Friedman underestimates the value of colonial history.
Colonial law can be seen as much more than a reflection of the colonial
life; it also can be viewed as reflecting the old common law of England,
33. See id.
34. See id. (stating that the Constitution drafted by the founding forefathers "was the first and
only Constitution of the United States" and is the "oldest living constitution" in the world).
35. Id.
36. See id.
37. See Pierce, supra note 5, at 620 (criticizing Friedman's earlier work for failing to connect
colonial law with the relevant moral values of the time).
38. See Stanley N. Katz, The Politics of Low in Colonial America, in LAW IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 257 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971).
39. Pierce, supra note 5, at 620.
40. Id. at 620-21.
41. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 24.
42. Pierce, supra note 5, at 619.
43. Id. (quoting FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 29).
2003)
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
which became a building block of a new American law.44 For example, a
"colonial legal historian might emphasize the continuity of both public
and private law from the eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries and argue
persuasively that the nineteenth century cannot be comprehended absent
a knowledge of its colonial antecedents.
'A5
Friedman's overview of colonial America leaves larger gaps in the
law's development than sections describing other eras. Friedman seems
to follow consumer demand in this book by devoting relatively more
attention to post-colonial times.46 However, his choice to downplay the
colonial era may be justified in that Friedman's expertise lies in post-
colonial American law and economics .47 In this regard, Friedman's ex-
planation of the history of slavery and general overview of early colonial
times only skims the surface. Although the book is just a "short history,"
greater depth of treatment of the colonial period would give the reader a
stronger historical base upon which to build in understanding subsequent
eras.
II. PROGRESSION OF LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
Friedman's account of the nineteenth century is more comprehen-
sive than that of other temporal eras in the book. The nineteenth century
produced a huge body of law relating to the economy.48 Friedman pri-
marily looks at the relationships among the economy, the law, and soci-
ety. However, in the nineteenth century, he also shows how social as-
pects of society can move the law to achieve society's desired results.49
This review evaluates just a few of Friedman's central themes for this
era: the myth of a laissez-faire economy; the dramatic change in tort
law; the rise of the contracts clause; slavery; and crime and punishment.
A. Laissez-faire: Myth or Reality?
Friedman contends that the notion that the nineteenth century was
the era of laissez-faire economics is not entirely true because the gov-
ernment's influence on the economy was significant.50 Friedman initially
contends that, during this period, the government gave people rights "so
basic that people tended to take them for granted." 5' Many people took
44. See id. at 621.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 619-20; see also supra notes 5, 37-45 and accompanying text.
47. See Pierce, supra note 5, at 623.
48. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 37.
49. Id.
50. Id. ("[People] took for granted, for example, the idea of private property-in land, in
commodities of all sorts.").
51. Id. But see Richard A. Epstein, Legal History: The Assault That Failed: The Progressive
Critique of Laissez Faire, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1697, 1699 (1999) (reviewing BARBARA H. FRIED, THE
PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS
MOVEMENT (1998)). Epstein argues, although the laissez-faire era takes a "cautious view of gov-
ernment power," the notion of laissez-faire did give immense value to the ideas of individual liberty,
[Vol. 80:3
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advantage of the basic right to contract, "the right to buy and sell, [and]
to make agreements, with the understanding that the force of law stood
behind these agreements. 52
The government had a larger impact on the economy in the nine-
teenth century than many historians credit.53 Although the government's
presence in everyday life was not as pervasive in the nineteenth century
as it is today,54 Friedman contends that the main aim of the government
then was "promotional; to enact laws to help the economy grow." 55 The
government concerned itself with creating ways to support the infrastruc-
ture of the "institutions that made economic growth possible. 56 For ex-
ample, the government created "roads, canals, bridges, ferries, and (later)
railroads" in order that farmers and merchants could get their goods to
market.57 The government also created what Friedman calls "the invisi-
ble infrastructure," which consisted of money, banks, and credit.58 Al-
though the government "had very little in the way of money," it had a
surplus of land.59 The government "used land grants to stimulate the
economy-grants to states for educational purposes, cheap land to set-
tlers," and uncultivated land to states "who would put it to productive
use.
,6°
Because of Friedman's "professional focus on state private law and
,,61its relation to our economy, some reviewers have characterized his
treatment of the economy as "over-emphasized" and at times bordering
"on the purely Marxian. ' '62 However, Friedman's unique view of Ameri-
can legal history enables the reader to compare not only law and society,
but also law and economics.
B. Applying Nineteenth Century Tort and Contract Law
Friedman argues that the law of torts also took a dramatic turn in the
nineteenth century.63 Torts constitute a civil, as opposed to a criminal,
wrong.64 Within tort doctrine, one of the largest nineteenth century de-
velopments was the law of negligence.65 The Industrial Revolution in-
the right to own property, and freedom of contract. Without these fundamental pieces of historical
power, American society could not operate as it does today. Id.
52. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 37.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 37-38.
55. Id. at 38.




60. Id. at 40-41. For example, states received swamp lands that they could sell for money to
build drainage systems and levees. Id. at 41.
61. Pierce, supra note 5, at 625.
62. Id. at 626.
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creased the use of machinery in the workplace, thereby causing more
accidents resulting in bodily harm.66 "Nothing does a better job of man-
gling human bodies than machines. 67 For example, Friedman notes that
"the explosion on the Sultana, a sidewheel steamboat, on April 27, 1865,
killed more than 1,700 people., 68 American law responded by, for the
first time, permitting an individual injured in an accident to recover dam-
ages without proving that the tortfeasor intended to injure the victim.
69
Many legal historians assert that the nineteenth century change in
tort law was a shift from "strict liability to a moralistic 'fault' princi-
ple. ' 70 Friedman comments that it was "not really accurate to talk about a
shift from strict liability; rather, there was a shift from no liability. '7 The
issue was not morality, but, instead, who should bear the risk of loss in
72an action in tort. Friedman takes a position similar to that of Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., separating morality from the liability framework.73
Holmes believed that, because the common law was uninterested in
evaluating the "state of mind" of the individual in deciding liability in a
negligence action, there could be no "individual moral culpability" in-
herent in attributing liability to an individual.74 Holmes evaluated tort
law in terms of "standard[s] of external conduct. 75 Hence, tortfeasors
could be liable for damages due to their negligence "even if they do their
incompetent best.,
76
Although the nineteenth century development of negligence in tort
created the legal vehicle for a victim to receive compensation for injury,
the law as applied at that time favored business over the individual in
determining where to place risks of lOSS. 77 Therefore, the external stan-
dards for reasonableness, by which an industry accused of doing wrong
was to be judged, were defined by industry itself.78 "The defendants were
the entrepreneurs, the doers, the bringers of wealth., 79 Friedman posits
66. See id. ("Railroad locomotives, belching fire and steam, and racing through the country-
side were a tremendous source of injuries and deaths").
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 43-44.
70. Id. at 44.
71. id.
72. See id.
73. See A.W. Brian Simpson, 1997 Survey of Books Relating to the Law: VIII, Legal History:
The Elusive Truth About Holmes, 95 MICH. L. REv. 2027, 2028 (1997) (reviewing DAVID
ROSENBERG, THE HIDDEN HOLMES: His THEORY OF TORTS IN HISTORY (1995)); see also O.W.
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 108 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1881). "A man may have as
bad a heart as he chooses, if his conduct is within the rules.... What the law really forbids, and the
only thing it forbids, is the act on the wrong side of the line, be that act blameworthy or otherwise."
Id. at 110.
74. Simpson, supra note 73, at 2027.
75. id. at 2028; see HOLMES, supra note 73, 110-11 ("The standard... must be fixed.").
76. Simpson, supra note 73, at 2028.
77. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 44-45.
78. See id.
79. Id. at 45.
[Vol. 80:3
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that, because the law follows society, law in the economic growth-
oriented nineteenth century followed the wealth.80 Thus, the courts at-
tributed liability to the wrongdoer only when the risk of loss fell on
someone other than an industrial defendant. 8'
To illustrate this point, Friedman discusses Farwell v. Boston &
82Worcester Railroad Corporation. In Farwell, a railroad employee was
badly injured on the job due to the actions of another employee.83 Far-
well sued his employer, the railroad, "claiming that the negligence of
another worker was the cause of his injury."84 The plaintiff relied on the
old "master and servant" rule, which provided that, "if an agent (a ser-
vant or employee), on the job, does something that harms somebody else,
that somebody could sue the principal (the master or employer), because
the principal is generally responsible for the acts of the agent., 85 In this
case, however, the court held that the master-servant rule imposed liabil-
ity on the employer only when the employee's actions injured a railroad
passenger, but did not apply when the victim was a fellow employee
engaged in the same work. 86 Friedman asserts that the underlying mes-
sage from Farwell was the power of enterprise and the movement of law
toward protecting business and industrial development. 87 Law favored
industry because society also favored industry.88 Society favored industry
because most Americans at this time lived in rural areas,89 so they
viewed development of the railroads and further enterprise as keys to
their economic prosperity.90 Therefore, as Friedman suggests, morality
was not a relevant factor in determining liability during the rise of enter-
prise, rather determining risks of loss resulted from industrial develop-
ment and the power of enterprise. 91
Friedman also discusses the impact of the Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of the Contracts Clause in the nineteenth century. 92 The Constitu-
tion prohibits individual states from enacting any regulation or law "im-
pairing the obligation of a contract. '93 Friedman argues that the Contracts
Clause was "about the relationship of government and the economy, par-
80. See id. at 44-45.
81. See id. at 46.
82. Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R. Corp., 45 Mass. 49 (1842).
83. Farwell, 45 Mass. at 55.
84. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 45; see Farwell, 45 Mass. at 55.
85. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 45.
86. Farwell, 45 Mass. at 54.
87. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 48.
88. See id. at 47.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 44-45.
92. Ld. at 51. The Contracts Clause was most likely created to prevent states from interfering
with creditors' rights in bankruptcy cases. Id.
93. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (The Contracts Clause states that: "No State shall...
pass any ... law impairing the obligation of contracts").
2003]
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ticularly in times of great financial uncertainty." 94 Friedman asserts that
"the whole point of the 'contracts clause' was to prevent states from go-
ing too far in helping out debtors," and thus to further protect enter-
prise.
95
The validity of Friedman's analysis is evident today in how courts
apply the Contracts Clause. Because the application of the Contracts
Clause in the courts can be inconsistent as a result of judicial discretion,
the government retains a vehicle to loosen or pull back the reigns of en-
terprise.96 Courts do not interpret the Contracts Clause "to prohibit all
impairment of contracts." 97 Instead, the courts apply a balancing test that
weighs the "contractors' private rights with the public interest in a man-
ner reminiscent of Lochner v. New York."98 In a practical application of
the Contracts Clause, judges do not have to follow precedent explicitly
because "[blalancing allows judges to weigh competing values on an ad
hoc basis, which permits them to change the weight they give to different
values over time."99
In effect, judicial discretion could have led to the opposite result of
Friedman's contention that the courts primarily chose to protect enter-
prise during this time period.'30 Because the balancing of interests is left
solely to judges, a decision could fall either way depending on the opin-
ion of a particular judge.10' However, sentiments of judges will most
likely follow the economic and moral standards defining the law at a
given time, as evidenced in the nineteenth century.10 2 Judges apply the
balancing test according to their own legal interpretation of a particular
case at hand. 0 3 Thus, the Contracts Clause allows the judiciary to skew a
clear legal rule, resulting in the Contracts Clause creating uncertainty for
persons subject to contract, as well as security for governmental inter-
vention in contracting during times of economic hardship. 
°4
By limiting himself to a chronological, subject-by-subject analysis,
Friedman overlooks the impact of contract law upon tort law during the
nineteenth century. Although separately Friedman comes to interesting
conclusions regarding the relationship between torts and the economy,
94. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 5 .
95. Id. Friedman notes that most states by this time had insolvency laws to protect "at least
some basic items from the clutch of creditors." Id. at 53.
96. See Michael B. Rappaport, Note: A Procedural Approach to the Contract Clause, 93
YALE L.J. 918, 919-22 (1984).
97. Id. at 919.
98. Id.; see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (applying the contracts clause balanc-
ing test).
99. See Rappaport, supra note 96, at 920.
100. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 51.
101. See Rappaport, supra note 96, at 920.
102. See, e.g., supra notes 77-91 and accompanying text (illustrating how the courts used their
discretion to promote and protect economic development in the tort liability context).
103. See Rappaport, supra note 96, at 919-21.
104. See id. at 921.
[Vol. 80:3
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and contracts and the economy, he fails to show the interrelationship the
two legal subjects had on the economy as a whole. Specifically, during
the nineteenth century, the legal regime was designed to allow "contract
to dominate," thereby allowing a party to contract out of tort liability.'0 5
Thus, "[tiotal exemption or too great cutting down of remedy by 'con-
tracting,' without regard for the tort phase of risk in hand" can result in
legal implications for both subject areas.' °6 In addition, by failing to con-
sider the relationship between torts and contracts, Friedman fails to con-
sider the affect that both legal subjects had in shaping and influencing
"social and economic behavior."' 07 After all, "while rules of law may be
enacted in response to social and economic pressures, those same rules
will influence and shape social and economic behavior."'
10 8
C. Nineteenth Century Slavery
Slavery not only continued, but, according to Friedman, became a
stronger institution in the South during the first half of the nineteenth
century because it was a strongly contested political issue.' °9 After the
Revolutionary War, the northern states abolished slavery while the
southern states expanded the institution." 0 Slavery remained "vital to the
southern economy" and thus became "an essential aspect of the social
structure.""' By 1860, the population of slaves in the United States "had
grown to 3,922,760, all of them in the South."'"12 While Friedman dis-
cusses race consciousness as an underlying social issue in his colonial
account of slavery, his nineteenth century discussion of slavery explores
continuing social complexities, such as the rise of segregation. Friedman
points out that by the turn of the century, many Southerners accepted
segregation. In fact, in Plessy v. Ferguson, the United States Supreme
Court "gave segregation its seal of approval" and explained "so long as
institutions were separate but equal, they were constitutionally accept-
able."" 
3
The battle between the North and South over slavery ultimately
ended in the Civil War, which had become "a crusade against slavery.
'' 14
President Lincoln delivered his Emancipation Proclamation, and later,
105. See John B. Clutterbuck, Note, Karl Llewellyn and the Intellectual Foundations of Enter-
prise Liability Theory, 97 YALE L.J. 1131, 1138 (1988).
106. Id.
107. Pierce, supra note 5, at 630.
108. Id.
109. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 69. Southern states continued to expand the body of slave
law; for example, slaves could not enter into a legal marriage, and it became a crime to teach a slave
to read or write. Id.
110. See id.
111. Id. at 69-70.
112. Paul Finkelman, The Centrality of the Peculiar Institution in American Legal Develop-
ment, 68 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1009, 1032 (1993).
113. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 70.
114. Id.
2003]
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the Thirteenth Amendment ended slavery-at least in theory.1 5 Al-
though people in the North did not accept the institution of slavery, they
also did not treat African-Americans as equals. 16 Friedman argues that,
because the northern states after the Civil War had become indifferent to
southern slave practices,' ' 7 the South "relapsed into white supremacy."'18
Friedman's "brief history" again raises unanswered questions. Were
white supremacy and segregation ways to extend the effects of slavery
despite its abolishment? Furthermore, why would the North suddenly
become indifferent to southern slave practices after crusading for years
for its abolition?
D. A Change in Crime and Punishment
The law of crime and punishment-specifically, the "rise of the
penitentiary and the development of urban police forces"-is another
area of the law that significantly changed in the nineteenth century." 9 In
colonial times, the onus was on the community to punish wrongdoers by
banishment, branding, or the like. 20 Friedman contends that, as opposed
to the godly colonial society, the booming population of the nineteenth
century brought a decay of community morals, and disorder and riots in
the streets, giving rise to a demand for urban control.' 2' The law re-
sponded by creating the penitentiary. 122 Friedman explains that "the peni-
tentiary was designed to remove the criminal" from the community while
enabling the prisoner to reform. 123 In addition, Friedman posits, the peni-
tentiary was designed to reduce capital punishment.1
2 4
Friedman describes the Cherry Hill penitentiary in Pennsylvania as
an example of the nineteenth century .penitentiary.125 The prison system
began as a strict, regimented system.'2 In Cherry Hill, inmates were iso-
lated and not allowed to speak under any circumstances pursuant to the
theory that time to think and prepare for re-entry into society would re-
form them.1
27
By the late nineteenth century, the strictly regimented system had
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was considered in the release process, and the parole system was intro-
duced into the criminal justice system.129 Friedman explains that the
"whole point of these devices was to shift emphasis away from the of-
fense, and put the emphasis on the offender himself-his character, his
personality, his propensities for good and evil."'130 As society progressed
towards a more individualistic society, Friedman argues, so did the law
itself.13 Here, as in his Crime and Punishment in American History,
Friedman "portrays the criminal law as a product of social forces-a
mirror of the society it regulates."'' 32 According to one commentator,
Friedman's narrow focus fails to consider "the power of the law to shape
social values," and, thus, "makes it an incomplete portrait of the criminal
law" and the justice system "in American history.' ' 133 The law itself "has
great power both to preserve the social order and to promote change, and
it is Friedman's failure to describe this half of the relationship between
law and society that renders his account flawed."' 134
III. LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
The twentieth century produced a huge body of new law. In his ac-
count of American legal history during this period, Friedman again
evaluates a vast array of subjects pertinent to the era. A few of his central
topics here include: criminal justice and the role of the federal govern-
ment, the evolution of tort law, and the Civil Rights Movement.
A. Criminal Justice and the Role of the Federal Government
In the twentieth century, social changes spurred change in the defi-
nition of crime and in the applicable punishments. 35 Friedman argues
that new technologies and innovations required new law.136 Automobiles
increased bank robberies; computers created the need for laws to punish
the computer hacker.1
37
Along with the increase in technological advancements, came the
growth in the federal government's role in criminal justice.3 8 The federal
government became involved in criminal justice for the first time, pass-
129. See id. at 83-84.
130. Id. at 84.
131. See id. at 84, 87.
132. Book Note, Mirror, Mirror, on the Wall, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1813 (1994) (review-
ing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1993)). Although
Friedman's book Crime and Punishment in American History is solely about criminal law and soci-
ety, Friedman fails to acknowledge the implication of law upon society in this book, a weakness
repeated in Law in America: A Short History. See, e.g., id. at 1817.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1815.
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ing a vast amount of federal criminal legislation. 39 Crime ultimately
became "a national issue-an issue in presidential politics.""' For ex-
ample, President Hoover appointed a task force to study violent crime,
14 1
and the growth of the Federal Bureau of Investigation under J. Edgar
Hoover's leadership opened the door for the federal government's entry
into the "law enforcement business.' 42
States also began to tighten up their criminal justice systems by
cracking down on a new surge of violent crime. 143 Friedman explains
that, beginning in Washington State in 1984, states began to enact "truth
in sentencing laws."'144 These laws required criminals to serve no less
than 85 percent of their entire prison sentences, thus eliminating to a
large degree credits given for good behavior."45 Federal monetary incen-
tives for prison construction accompanied these "truth in sentencing
laws," '46 and most states jumped on the bandwagon to receive the federal
grants. 147
Heightened societal demand to punish criminals, along with federal
monetary incentives, stimulated the growth of the United States' huge
population of prisoners according to Friedman."48 Friedman's argument
partially explains the increase in the prison population, but does not ad-
dress the effect the law itself has on the population of prisoners. Some
attribute the prisons' population growth to the growing number and com-
plexity of laws, which creates more reasons to prosecute an individual.1
49
Friedman posits that the war on drugs is another reason for the dra-
matic growth in the prison population. 150 Friedman discusses how
American values and the law have eliminated most other victimless
crimes, such as sex outside of marriage.' 5' However, the drug laws re-
main an anomaly that in many states make possible life imprisonment for
a drug offense. 52 Friedman draws a valid conclusion here, but fails to
acknowledge the underlying American societal values inherent in the
139. See id. at 107. The National Motor Vehicle Theft Act was passed making it a federal
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148. Id. In 1998, California alone had more prisoners than "France, Great Britain, Germany,
Japan, Singapore, and the Netherlands combined." Id.
149. See generally R. George Wright, The Illusion of Simplicity: An Explanation of Why the
Law Can't Just Be Less Complex, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 715 (2000) (discussing complexity in the
law).
150. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 115.
151. Id. at 115-16.
152. Id. at 116.
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decision to fill prisons with non-violent drug offenders. Many people
perceive, or even believe, an act is criminal because it is illegal. 53 In
addition, "law confers legitimacy because it persuades us that the exist-
ing social order is necessary, and, if not ideal, at least reasonable."' 154 In
other words, "the criminal justice system legitimates its own rules and
outcomes.' 55 Again, Friedman's critics note, "Law has great power both
to preserve the social order and to promote change."'156 Thus, Friedman
fails to address the independent impact that law, itself, can have on social
order and law enforcement in society.1
57
In his analysis, Friedman fails to consider how history has shaped
the development of twentieth century change. Although he correctly
identifies new aspects of modem-day technology that require changes to
be made in the law, such as the rise of computer crime, he fails to de-
velop this theory. How did we get from there to here? Is moral decay
multiplying exponentially over time, creating the social need for new
laws, or is America creating new laws that criminalize more behavior?
Friedman recognizes that prohibition and the drug wars "put millions of
dollars into the pockets of men like Al Capone,"'5 8 yet he fails to realize
that law actually can drive crime as well as hamper it.
159
B. Tort Law in the Twentieth Century
As the twentieth century progressed and society became more indi-
vidualistic, the nature of tort law had to change.16° No longer could a
court consistently side with enterprise. 16' One prominent example oc-
curred in the area of products liability. 62 Friedman discusses the land-
mark case of MacPherson v. Buick163 to support this contention.
In MacPherson, the plaintiff purchased an automobile with a defec-
tive wheel, which caused an accident that injured him.164 MacPherson
sued the auto manufacturer, Buick. 165 Historically, under the law of priv-
ity, MacPherson could have sued only the dealer from which he pur-
chased the automobile because no privity existed between him and the
153. Book Note, supra note 132, at 1817 (criticizing an earlier Friedman book for his narrow
view of the criminal justice system and its impact on the law).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1815.
157. See id.
158. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 104.
159. See Book Note, supra note 132, at 1813. As an example, just as the criminalization of
alcohol during prohibition made bootlegging more profitable for the criminal, the drug war has made
narcotics trafficking more profitable for the drug lords.
160. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 129.
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. MacPherson v. Buick, 217 N.Y. 382 (1916).
164. See MacPherson, 217 N.Y. at 384.
165. See id.
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manufacturer. 166 Friedman asserts that "[Judge] Cardozo effectively un-
dermined the old rule," thereby giving birth to products liability as we
now know it and signaling the end of the age of enterprise. 67 For the first
time, privity was abandoned in tort, and "if a product was dangerous, and
caused harm, the victim must be able to sue the manufacturer di-
rectly."' 168 After MacPherson, many other states followed Cardozo's
holding and removed privity as an obstacle in determining liability in a
tort action.
169
Friedman explains that liability expanded dramatically after
MacPherson with the emergence of the strict liability doctrine in which a
product manufacturer could be held liable despite no finding of negli-
gence.170 Friedman's analysis, again, attributes legal development to
changes in the economy and the rise of individualism, but fails to address
another important social phenomena-the growing demand for fair-
ness.' 7' The practical distinction between the time of Farwell and
MacPherson is that an emerging concern in twentieth century society
was protecting the small party to an accident; that fairness should be a
factor in determining risk of loss, shifting the risk toward big business.
172
The early years of national development were lean times, when society
placed a high value on strengthening the economy, but during prosperous
times that followed the Industrial Revolution, society came to view cor-
porations as too powerful. Because the corporate defendant generally has
the deepest pockets, 173 in some cases fairness dictates that liability should
accrue to the party who is best able to bear the cost.
174
C. The Civil Rights Movement
In addition to dramatic changes in tort law, Friedman also discusses
one of the twentieth century's most significant historical developments-
the Civil Rights movement.17 After many years of segregation and un-
fair treatment of African-Americans, the Supreme Court overruled Plessy
v. Ferguson.176 In the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education,
177
the Court ruled that "all school segregation violated the Fourteenth





171. See Valerie P. Hans, The Illusions and Realities of Jurors' Treatment of Corporate De-
fendants, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 327, 350 (1998) (explaining that in determining the liability of a
corporate defendant, many jurors emphasize the issue of fairness in their consideration of damages).
172. See id. at 350-52.
173. See id. at 329.
174. See id. at 337 (explaining that jurors may consider how "the financial equities" of an
award will affect the party paying damages; thus, fairness may establish that a corporate defendant
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175. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 140.
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Amendment."' 7 8 Friedman argues that, although Brown was a cautious
case in that it only pertained to education, Brown was the beginning of
the end. 1
79
After Brown, Friedman asserts the "Supreme Court struck down
every instance of official apartheid that came before it: parks, swimming
pools, public facilities in general.' 80 Friedman suggests that federal
court jurisprudence changed race relations dramatically and that, in the
last half of the century, "race relations in the United States were totally
revolutionized."' 81 This is true with respect to the changing racial
dynamics in the country and the acceptance of minorities in equal
positions in the work force. However, Friedman fails to discuss the
lingering impact of race consciousness and geography on American
society in the twenty-first century.
Soon after the courts ordered desegregation, many schools fell di-
rectly back to segregated conditions. Although segregation ceased to
exist in its most heinous form, which historically had barred African-
American children from particular schools, segregation remained in the
form of geographic segregation and socioeconomic inequality because
many minorities lacked the financial resources to live in wealthier, pre-
dominantly white school districts. 82 Therefore, race relations cannot
possibly be totally revolutionized as Friedman suggests because, had race
relations been revolutionized, socioeconomic segregation would have
ended with court-ordered integration of schools and workplaces.1
83
With respect to the twentieth century, Friedman provides an inter-
esting account of the change in the criminal justice system due to in-
creased federal criminal legislation. In addition, he effectively documents
the change in tort liability and the significant progress made in the Civil
Rights Movement. Although he fails to identify the impact that law itself
can have upon society, and belittles the complications inherent in deseg-
regation, Friedman's overall presentation of the law's role in the twenti-
eth century is adequately portrayed.
178. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 142; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating in relevant part,
"nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
179. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 143.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 263 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (com-
menting that replacing the desegregation order "with a system of neighborhood school assignments
for grades K-4 resulted in a system of racially identifiable schools").
183. Cf id. at 263-64.
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IV. AMERICAN LAW AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY
In the last temporal era in his book, Friedman explores the role of
the legal profession in modem America and the shift toward national
unity. Although society has become more individualistic over time, the
national government has unified the nation by providing all Americans
access to information on an equal basis. Although little time has passed
in the present century, Friedman gives an exceptional account of law's
current role in society.
A. The Lawyer's Role in the New Millennium
Friedman argues that the law continues to be an important aspect of
American life.184 The role of the legal profession has become vital to our
society due to the sheer volume of law created in the past two centu-
ries. 1 85 "In a society where 'law' is everywhere, there is everywhere a
need for people who know how to use it or abuse it.' 186 The economy
Americans worked so hard to build over time created and will continue
to create new legal problems. As Friedman asserts, "All big modern
economies need lawyers."'' 87 Whether running the administrative state,
writing a contract, or sealing a deal, the modem economy needs legal
help, and thus it needs lawyers.
1 88
In the past, Friedman has been criticized for failing to give "any
systematic consideration of the interrelationship of law, legal institutions,
lawyers, legal education, and legal literature and their relative impact on
the development of American legal history."1 89 Here, Friedman remedies
the problem by describing the lawyer's role in everyday life and history,
discussing the continuing surge in the number of law schools, and the
many different facets of business that the law must address. 90 Although
Friedman does not address the effects that the growing legal community
has "on the nonlegal spheres with which it admittedly interacts," 191 his
account of how the function of modern day lawyers and law firms has
evolved explains even to the layperson the need for lawyers in contem-
porary American society.
184. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 165.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 168.
188. See id. at 169.
189. Pierce, supra note 5, at 628.
190. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 166-68.




B. The Shift Toward National Government
Friedman also contends that the shift towards national government
seems to be a continuing trend. 92 Americans are coming together as a
unified nation, "[a]nd, as the culture gravitates to one central point, so,
too, does the law."' 193 Friedman explains that "in times of crisis-the
Great Depression, the two world wars, the savage attack on the World
Trade Center in September 2001-the country looks to its leader, to its
center, to the national government. ' 94 Americans look to Washington
for answers to "national problems" because, as Friedman persuasively
argues, "[cllassic federalism is, in truth, quite dead."'195 Friedman posits
that "the federal government can do almost anything-can regulate any-
thing-and the restrictions of federalism do not really hem it in."'196 For
example, even if the state retains the power to freely spend block grants
provided by the federal government, "Congress can choose not to use"
them if it wishes.
197
Friedman argues that another reason that society gravitates toward
the federal government is increased media attention. 198 The President has
become a movie star in the spotlight.' 99 Friedman contends that the me-
dia and the public are consumed with his role as leader of the govern-
ment and entertained by his personal life.20 Government in the twenty-
first century sits in a glass house, which everyone peers into through the
media. 20 1 As a result, "what we see is of course not 'government,' but
images and personalities. The public knows less and thinks it knows
more." 202 Friedman makes an interesting point in asserting that govern-
ment is bigger because we see more of it. An alternate view, however, is
that the government is growing in complexity20 3 and, therefore, citizens
may feel they need to know more in order to adequately protect their
interests. In addition, Americans want to know more; society is hooked
on the national government's daily soap opera produced by the media.
To that effect, Friedman observes that "the.celebrity nature of authority,
of leadership, means that society is governed, not so much by the invisi-
ble hand, as by the visible tube., 20 4 As such, "politics [have] become just
192. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 170.
193. Id. at 171.
194. Id. at 171-72.
195. Id. at 173.
196. Id. at 171.
197. Id. at 173.
198. See id. at 175.
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another reality show, like Survivor or Big Brother. The electorate is the
audience. The campaign is the show. 2°5
Friedman's short account of the role of law in the new millennium
is proportionate to the short period of time that has passed since its be-
ginning. Friedman effectively explains the importance of the legal pro-
fession in our complicated society. In addition, he gives a keen account
of the relationship between the media and society's shift to unify as a
nation through a mutual interest in the national government.
CONCLUSION
From colonial America to the present, a vast amount of law has
been created in response to the needs and norms of society. Friedman's
Law in America: A Short History is a quick trip though time, displaying
his view of the relationship between law and society. In addition to
showing how society shapes current law, this book also gives a unique
account of the relationship between the law and economy. Friedman pro-
vides an accurate account of the historical reasoning and development of
American law, although his book could expand on. certain areas of the
law to present a more thorough look at every temporal era covered in the
book. These few shortcomings are likely due to the fact that it is a "short
history." Friedman artfully explains how history creates and moves the
law and how law ultimately is a reflection of our society. As Friedman
concludes, "Law is the glue that binds the cells of Leviathan's body; and
the body of society itself."20 6 This book is worth the read and may be
attractive to both the legal historian and the lay reader, wishing to take a
limited glance at America's legal history and, particularly, how eco-
nomic forces drive legal change.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 183.
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